Sudden Emergency Doctrine

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What Is The “Sudden Emergency Doctrine”?

By Jaime E. Suarez

When a driver is confronted with a sudden emergency, he is not held to the same standard of care that would otherwise be expected, but neither is he excused from not acting in a reasonable and prudent manner.1 Once the emergency arises, a driver is not negligent, provided he has used due care to avoid meeting such an emergency and, after it arises, he exercises such care as a reasonably prudent and capable driver would use under the unusual circumstances, which is usually a question for the jury.2

Scott v. City of Opa Locka - Background Facts3

One night a male (J. Jackson) entered a bar and held up the bar manager. During the holdup, the manager activated a silent alarm system to the police headquarters of the defendant, the City of Opa Locka.
The Police Headquarters notified Officers J.T. and J.B. who were in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, the officers proceeded in separate vehicles to the bar. Officer J.T. parked his police car along the curb directly in front of one of the bar doors while Officer J.B. pulled his vehicle in front of the other door of the bar.
As Officer J.T. approached the bar door, J. Jackson came out and brushed Officer J.T. who ordered him to stop. J. Jackson, who had a pistol in his hand, turned and fired a shot which hit Officer J.T. An exchange of gun fire commenced during which Officer J.T. was hit again and as a result fell to the ground.
While on the ground and bleeding, Officer J.T. fired four remaining shots at Jackson who was also hit but was still able to run and leave the area. The entire incident lasted only a few seconds.
As a result of this exchange of fire, a bullet fired from Officer J.T.’s revolver struck and fatally wounded one innocent victim (J. Scott) who was sitting on the hood of a car some 110 yards north of Officer J.T., who stated that he did not see anyone in the street in the direction that Jackson fled.
Thereafter Mrs. Scott, the surviving wife of J. Scott, filed a wrongful death action against the City of Opa Locka and its liability insurer, National Indemnity Company. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, City of Opa Locka and its liability insurer.

The Appeal

On appeal, the plaintiff Mrs. Scott argued that giving the ‘sudden emergency’ instruction to the jury was error. This jury instruction stated in pertinent part:
Two questions of fact must be answered by you, the jury: One, whether the defendant was faced with an emergency situation; and, whether he acted as a reasonable man under the circumstances.
It is not within the purview of the trial judge to make such factual determinations. It is solely within the province of the jury.
Any emergency is a sudden or unexpected event or combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action; in an emergency, the actor is left no time for thought or is reasonable so disturbed or excited, that he cannot weigh alternative courses of action and must make a speedy decision, based largely on impulse or guess; whether a person is confronted with such a situation is for you, the jury, to determine.
If you find that the officer did not act as a reasonable prudent police officer should act under the existing circumstances, then you should find for the plaintiff. ‘If you find that the police officer acted as a reasonably prudent police officer should, then you should find for the defendant city.4
On appeal, Florida Third District Court of Appeal started its analysis, stating that the “requisite factual requirements to support an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine are
(1) that the claimed emergency actually or apparently existed;
(2) that the perilous situation was not created or contributed to by the person confronted;
(3) that alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were open to such person; and
(4) that the action or course taken was such as would or might have been taken by a person of reasonable prudence in the same or similar situation.” 5
The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that “[w]ithout doubt,” the facts as reflected by the record were sufficient to satisfy the above requirements.6 The Third District Court of Appeal found no error on the part of the trial judge in charging the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine.7

Another Example - Wallace v. National Fisheries, Inc.8

In this case, R.N. was driving north at a high rate of speed on a six lane expressway. R.N.’s vehicle rear-ended the Wallace’s vehicle. Wallace was driving. After being rear-ended by R.N.’s vehicle, Wallace's vehicle jumped the grass median separating the north and south lanes of the roadway and careened directly into the path of Wright.
Wright had been driving south, driving a National Fisheries truck. According to Wright, he first saw the Wallace vehicle as it crossed the median, some 300 feet away from him, approaching him at an angle from the left, while Wright was penned in by a concrete barrier wall on his right. By the time the Wallace vehicle reached Wright's lane, less than a car length separated the vehicles. The only eye witness, aside from Wright, was Ms. Lopez. Her testimony confirmed that Wright hit Wallace within seconds of Wallace coming to a stop. Wallace was killed.
Although Wallace’s estate sued Wright, National Fisheries, and R.N. for negligence, Wright and National Fisheries moved for summary judgment, arguing R.N.'s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. They also argued that Wright and National Fisheries that under the sudden emergency doctrine, Wright had no duty to look out for such an unexpected danger from a direction where there was no reason to apprehend any.
In response, Wallace’s estate maintained that Wright had an unobstructed view of Wallace and five to seven seconds to avoid the accident. Furthermore, Wallace’s estate stated that Wright had been speeding and that excessive speed contributed to the collision. Finally, Wallace’s estate submitted the affidavit of an expert who concluded that Wright had been traveling in excess of the speed limit, that Wright had sufficient time to observe the Wallace vehicle cross the median and two southbound lanes, and that Wright's failure to keep a proper watch on the road and to take evasive action was a proximate cause of the accident.
Despite this affidavit, the trial court granted summary judgment in Wright and National Fisheries' favor, and essentially dismissed the case.

The Appeal

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal initiated its analysis outlining the four requisite factual requirements in considering the application of the sudden emergency doctrine.9 The court further stated that “[t]he presence or absence of a sudden emergency situation is a question of fact ordinarily to be decided by the jury,” and “[s]o, too, is the issue of whether, under the circumstances, the defendant reacted to the situation in a prudent manner.”10
The Third District Court of Appeal stated that Wright had a duty to drive carefully and avoid hitting other drivers.11 The court also cited to a 1959 Florida Supreme Court case which concluded that the driver of an automobile, a “dangerous instrumentality”, is charged with the responsibility of having his vehicle under control at all times, commensurate with the circumstances and the locale, and to maintain a sharp and attentive lookout in order to keep himself prepared to meet the exigencies of an emergency within reason and consistent with reasonable care and caution.12
The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that whether Wright had the time, space, and capacity to avoid the accident were all questions of fact. The court pointed out that there was testimony that at least four or five seconds elapsed between the time Wallace's car was first hit and the time it came to a stop in the southbound lane, and that another two seconds was estimated to have elapsed between the time Wallace came to a stop and the time Wright hit him.13 The police found no evidence that Wright had attempted to stop or swerve.14
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment ruling that “whether the driver of the fish truck had an opportunity to control his vehicle so as to have avoided the impact, or whether he had time to have applied the truck's brakes and thus lessen the severity of the impact are, under our comparative negligence standards, questions for a jury to resolve.”15
1 Vantran Industries, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., --- So.2d ----, 2006 WL 3698900, *1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Dupree v. Pitts, 159 So.2d 904, 906-07 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
2 Vantran Industries, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., supra (quoting Dupree v. Pitts, 159 So.2d at 906 (quoting Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law & Practice, Sec. 668, pp. 538-45)) (quotations omitted).
3 This is a recitation of the facts outlined in Scott v. City of Opa Locka, 311 So.2d 825, 826 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975).
4 See Scott v. City of Opa Locka, 311 So.2d at 826.
5 See Scott v. City of Opa Locka, 311 So.2d at 826 (citing Dupree v. Pitts, 159 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964).
6 See Scott v. City of Opa Locka, 311 So.2d at 827.
7 Id.
8 This is a recitation of the facts outlined in Wallace v. National Fisheries, Inc., 768 So.2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
9 The requisite factual requirements to support an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine are
(1) that the claimed emergency actually or apparently existed;
(2) that the perilous situation was not created or contributed to by the person confronted;
(3) that alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were open to such person; and
(4) that the action or course taken was such as would or might have been taken by a person of reasonable prudence in the same or similar situation.
10 See Wallace v. National Fisheries, Inc., 768 So.2d 17, 18-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (quoting Scott v. City of Opa Locka, 311 So.2d 825, 826-27 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) and Cleveland v. City of Miami, 263 So.2d 573 (Fla.1972)).
11 See Wallace v. National Fisheries, Inc., 768 So.2d 17 at 19.
12 See Wallace v. National Fisheries, Inc., supra (quoting Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619, 621 (Fla. 1959)).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See Wallace v. National Fisheries, Inc., 768 So.2d 17 at 19.